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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of clandestine communications,
i.e., communications that are meant to be invisible to third-
party eavesdroppers, in the context of wireless sensor net-
works. Although encryption and anonymous routing proto-
cols can hide the content and the routing information, the
transmission activities of sensors on the same route can still
reveal the information ﬂow. In this work, a perfectly clan-
destine scheduling method is developed to hide the desired
information ﬂow in a sequence of independent transmission
activities resembling those without any ﬂow, while satis-
fying the resource constraint at the relay nodes in terms
of limited buffer size. The proposed method is proved to
achieve the maximum throughput, which is characterized
analytically for transmission schedules following alternat-
ing renewal processes with a closed-form solution for Pois-
son processes. The analytical results are veriﬁed through
numerical simulations on synthetic trafﬁc as well as traces.
Keywords: Clandestine communications, Scheduling al-
gorithms, Performance analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of clandestine communications in
wireless sensor networks. Clandestine communications re-
fer to the scenario where the act of communication needs
to be kept secret from eavesdroppers distributed in the ﬁeld.
In contrast to watermarking techniques which hide secret
information in open communications, clandestine commu-
nications require the overall act ofcommunication to behid-
den. Although various anonymous routing protocols have
been developed to hide information in trafﬁc content (in-
cluding both packet headers and data portions) through en-
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cryption and pseudonyms [1], trafﬁc activities can still re-
veal the presence of communications [2]. In this paper, we
propose to enable truly clandestine communications by de-
ploying clandestine relays1, which hide the correlation be-
tween incoming and outgoing trafﬁc not only in the con-
tent domain (by implementing anonymous routing proto-
cols) but also intheactivity domain (byusing proper schedul-
ing mechanisms speciﬁed later). Clandestine communica-
tion is crucial to the success of clandestine military op-
erations where the act is to be kept as invisible as possi-
ble. It is also a popular technique in anonymous network-
ing where the sources and/or destinations of ﬂows are hid-
den from trafﬁc monitors [3]. Moreover, it has signiﬁcant
implications in network security problems such as worm-
hole attacks [4], where an intruder channels information
ﬂows through a tunnel unknown to the source and the des-
tination. Understanding to what degree a clandestine relay
can carry information ﬂows without being detected by net-
worked trafﬁc monitors is critical to managing clandestine
communications, and to study this “degree” in a rigorous
and quantitative manner is at the core of this paper.
Weassume omnipresent and fully networked trafﬁcmon-
itors. We will restrict the monitors’ observation to timing
information only. Other ﬂow information, e.g., addresses,
ﬂow types, and packet content, will certainly make the mon-
itors more powerful, but will at the same time limit the
scope of the analysis since such information is hidden in
many anonymous routing protocols. Obviously, it would
not be possible to track a speciﬁc packet just based on tim-
ing. Resource constraints at the relay node, however, may
introduce traceable patterns at the ﬂow level. In this paper,
we focus on the buffer size constraint, which implies that
the amount of information buffered at a relay node has to
be bounded by the maximum buffer size at any time, in-
troducing certain statistical correlation across traces on the
same ﬂow path and thus revealing the ﬂow. To hide the
ﬂow, nodes have to embed the ﬂow transmission into cover
trafﬁc2 that follows their normal transmission schedules, a
particular type of which is a set of statistically independent
schedules. Since not every transmission in the schedule sat-
1In contrast, a covert relay is a relay node that hides its identity al-
though the presence of ﬂow may be detectable.
2Cover trafﬁc is the overall trafﬁc observable to monitors that in-
cludes the transmission of both the ﬂow and the chaff trafﬁc. In contrast,
relay nodes can see the trafﬁc content and thus distinguish the ﬂow from
the chaff.
1 of 7isﬁes the ﬂow constraints, such embedding may lead to rate
loss, and it is our goal to characterize such loss.
1.1. Summary of Contributions and Limitations
The main focus of this paper is on the fundamental limit of
clandestine communications. Our contributions are three-
fold:
Optimalﬂow-scheduling algorithm: Wedevelop alinear-
complexity algorithm that matches the maximum amount of
transmissions for a given pair of transmission schedules un-
der a buffer size constraint. The algorithm, using the First
Come, First Serve (FCFS) principle, is sequential and thus
suitable for online scheduling of information ﬂows under
predetermined transmission schedules.
Performance analysis: We then analyze the proposed
algorithm tocharacterize itsefﬁciency, measured bythe frac-
tion of embedded ﬂow in the cover trafﬁc (i.e., the maxi-
mum normalized clandestine throughput). Assuming ON-
OFF renewal schedules, we derive an analytical solution
based on the limiting distribution of a Markov-modulated
random walk constructed via the scheduling algorithm. For
small packets, we give a closed-form solution for expo-
nential inter-packet delays, which then provides bounds for
other distributions. The analysis shows that the clandestine
throughput is negatively related to the level of trafﬁc bursti-
ness.
Simulation studies: We complement the analysis with
simulations on both synthetic trafﬁc and real traces. Besides
conﬁrming the analytical results, the simulations also show
that renewal trafﬁc with power-law inter-packet delays can
closely approximate the clandestine throughputs of traces.
As an analytical study, our results are limited by the
models and assumptions such as the renewal trafﬁc assump-
tion, although our case study of traces has shown that with
proper distributions, renewal processes can model network
trafﬁc reasonably well (Section 5.3). We will leave more
extensive trace studies to future work.
1.2. Related Work
The problem of characterizing the maximum throughput of
clandestine networking has not been formally studied in the
past, but problems sharing common concepts have been in-
vestigated. The problem of avoiding Internet trafﬁc anal-
ysis has been considered in [5], which uses a special re-
lay called Mix to mix and re-encrypt packets from multiple
users to hide the sources of individual packets; long packet
streams can still be correlated. To prevent such ﬂow corre-
lation, the method of cover trafﬁc is used to pad the actual
trafﬁc with dummy packets such that the overall transmis-
sion activities conform to predetermined schedules [3], al-
though this method suffers from synchronization and efﬁ-
ciency problems. The most related work is [6], which ana-
lyzes the throughput of clandestine communications under
strict delay constraints. This work differs from [6] in that:
we assume unbounded delay but bounded buffer size, and
we use ON-OFF schedules instead of point process sched-
ules. We feel the new models better suit applications in sen-
sor networks because of their stringent resource constraints
and bursty communication needs. The results presented in
this paper also extend the earlier work in [2,7] that assumed
Poisson transmission schedules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
deﬁnes the problem, andSection 3presents aﬂow-scheduling
algorithm, which isanalyzed inSection 4. Section 5presents
simulation results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
For clarity of presentation, we use uppercase letters to de-
note random variables, lowercase letters for realizations,
boldface letters for vectors, and plain letters for scalars.
2.1. Flow Models
Denote the incoming and outgoing transmission schedules
of a relay node by ON-OFF processes Si (i = 1, 2)
Si
∆ =([Ss
i(k), St
i(k)])∞
k=1, (1)
where Ss
i(k) is the starting time and St
i(k) the terminating
time ofthe kth packet, with apacket length3 Li(k)
∆ =St
i(k)−
Ss
i(k). Schedules (S1, S2) specify the generation of cover
trafﬁc, which is what the trafﬁc monitor can observe4.
Under predetermined schedules, the act of relay can be
considered a process of embedding an information ﬂow into
these schedules. Speciﬁcally, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we
model such embedding by a decomposition
Li(k) = L
(I)
i (k) + L
(C)
i (k), (2)
where L
(I)
i (k) denotes the length of the information por-
tion of a packet, deﬁned by the portion that is generated by
3Since the problem is deﬁned in the time domain, we measure packet
length by the time taken to transmit that packet.
4We note that cover trafﬁc may include transmission failures, and the
clandestine throughput calculated hereby is thus an optimistic estimate
of the actual throughput achieved. From the source’s perspective, it can
replace the schedules by distributions of successful transmissions to pre-
dict the achievable throughput.
2 of 7the source and will reach the destination, and L
(C)
i (k) the
length of chaff noise. Chaff noise models portions of trans-
missions that are not relayed from the source to the destina-
tion, including dummy packets, dropped packets, superﬂu-
ous data padded in packets, and multiplexed packets from
other ﬂows. Information bits and chaff bits can be mixed
in any order within a packet, and L
(I)
i (k), L
(C)
i (k) denote
their total lengths, respectively (either of them can be zero).
S1
S2
Ss
1(k) St
1(k)
L1(k)
L
(I)
1 (k)
L
(C)
1 (k)
relay
information chaff
Fig. 1. Decompose each transmission in Si (i = 1, 2) into
an information portion and chaff noise, where the informa-
tion portions in the two schedules have to be 1-1 matched.
We say that transmission schedules (S1, S2) contain an
embedded information ﬂow if they can be decomposed as in
(2) such that the following deﬁnition holds.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A pair of transmission schedules (S1, S2)
with effective packet lengths (L
(I)
1 , L
(I)
2 ) is a (two-hop) in-
formation ﬂow if the following conditions hold:
Flow-conservation:
∞  
k=1
L
(I)
1 (k) =
∞  
k=1
L
(I)
2 (k), i.e., the
volume of information-carrying trafﬁc has to be conserved
during relay.
Causality:
 
st
1(k)≤t
L
(I)
1 (k) ≥
 
ss
2(k)≤t
L
(I)
2 (k) for any t >
0, i.e., the relay packet can only start transmitting after the
original packet is completely received.
Bounded buffer size:
 
st
1(k)≤t
L
(I)
1 (k)−
 
ss
2(k)≤t
L
(I)
2 (k) ≤
b for any t > 0, i.e., the amount of information bits awaiting
relay cannot exceed the maximum buffer size b at any time5.
The above deﬁnition allows packets to be combined,
split, delayed, andpermuted during relay. Theﬂow-conservation
constraint deﬁnes a relay operation, the causality constraint
ensures temporal order of reception and relay, and the buffer
size constraint models the resource limitation atrelay nodes.
Note that the causality constraint is specially designed to re-
quire that information in a packet can only be relayed after
the whole packet arrives, which enables packet-level trans-
formation such as decryption and re-encryption. Weassume
that the constant b is known.
5In reality, there will be two other (smaller) buffers to store packets
during their reception and transmission, which are not included here.
2.2. Maximum Clandestine Throughput
The constraints in Deﬁnition 2.1 imply that not every trans-
mission in given schedules can be used to relay information.
We measure the efﬁciency of relaying information ﬂow un-
der given schedules by maximum clandestine throughput,
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Given transmission schedules (S1, S2), the
maximum normalized throughput ofaclandestine relay (max-
imum clandestine throughput) under these schedules is de-
ﬁned as the maximum asymptotic fraction of embedded in-
formation ﬂows, i.e.,
Tb(S1, S2)
∆ = sup{r ∈ [0, 1] : ∃(L
(I)
i )2
i=1 such that:
1) (Si)2
i=1 with effective packet lengths
(L
(I)
i )2
i=1 is an information ﬂow ;
2) liminf
N→∞
N  
k=1
L
(I)
1 (k) + L
(I)
2 (k)
N  
k=1
L1(k) + L2(k)
≥ r a.s.}. (3)
Underthis deﬁnition, the maximum clandestine through-
put isthelong-term fraction ofinformation blocks (inlength),
maximized over all possible ways of embedding them into
the given schedules. Intuitively, certain rate loss will occur
if the relay has to embed the ﬂow into given transmission
schedules rather than simply forwarding packets as they ar-
rive, and the maximum clandestine throughput is the ratio
of ﬂow rates with and without clandestine relay.
3. OPTIMAL FLOW-SCHEDULING ALGORITHM
Given two transmission schedules, there are many ways to
embed an information ﬂow in them, some achieving higher
throughputs than others. In this section, we aim at devel-
oping algorithms that embed ﬂows optimally to achieve the
maximum clandestine throughput.
Forschedules following general ON-OFFprocesses, the
proposed scheduling algorithm is called “Bounded Buffer
Relay” (BBR), presented in Algorithm 1. Algorithm BBR
is based on the idea of First Come, First Serve (FCFS): it
uses variables B(n) to keep track of the amount of used
buffer (lines 5, 7)6, checks for buffer overﬂow or under-
ﬂow after each arrival or departure, and records the super-
ﬂuous amount as chaff bits in another variable C (lines 9,
12), which is then used to compute the overall fraction of
non-chaff bits. The above procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2.
6Notethat L(n) isthepacket lengthincover trafﬁc. Theactual length
of the information portion may be smaller.
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MemoryRelay” (BMR)proposed in[2]forembedding ﬂows
into transmission schedules modeled by point processes.
Algorithm BMR operates on schedules represented by point
processes and thus ignores different packet sizes. It has
been shown in [2] that BMRis optimal in that it achieves the
maximum throughput under arbitrary realizations of point
processes. Similar arguments can also be used to show the
optimality of BBR, details omitted due to space limit.
Algorithm 1 Bounded Buffer Relay (BBR)
Require: Realizations of ON-OFF processes (s1, s2).
Ensure: Return the maximum fraction of information bits
in (s1, s2) under the constraints in Deﬁnition 2.1.
1: s ← merge st
1, ss
2
2: initial values: C ← 0, B(0) ← 0
3: for all s(n) in s do
4: if s(n) is from st
1 then {a packet arrives}
5: B(n) ← B(n − 1) + L(n) {L(n): packet size}
6: else {s(n) is from ss
2, i.e., a packet departs}
7: B(n) ← B(n − 1) − L(n)
8: if B(n) > b then {buffer overﬂow}
9: C ← C + B(n) − b {count the amount of chaff}
10: B(n) ← b
11: else if B(n) < 0 then {buffer underﬂow}
12: C ← C − B(n)
13: B(n) ← 0
14: return 1 − C/
 
 
n
(L1(n) + L2(n))
 
s1
s2
s(n)
B(n) Chaff
s(1)s(2)s(3) s(4)
st
1(1) st
1(2)
ss
2(1)
st
1(3)
b
0
Fig. 2. BBR: Keep track of used buffer size B(n), updating
its value after each arrival and before each departure and
inserting chaff bits if needed to ensure B(n) ∈ [0, b].
4. THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS
Theoptimality of BBRallows us to compute the clandestine
throughput by applying it to given transmission schedules.
Such an algorithmic solution, however, provides little in-
sight into the relationship between the clandestine through-
put and external parameters such as statistical properties of
the schedules and the maximum buffer size. To this end,
we study the maximum clandestine throughput of certain
families of schedules and derive analytical characterization
accordingly.
4.1. Alternating Renewal Processes
Since thecomputation ofthemaximum clandestine through-
put is fundamentally an analysis of the asymptotic perfor-
mance of the optimal scheduling algorithm BBR,it is essen-
tial to model the operations of BBR mathematically. Based
on Algorithm 1, we see that the key operation is the follow-
ing update:
B(n) =
 
min(b, B(n − 1) + L(n)) if S(n) ∈ St
1,
max(0, B(n − 1) − L(n)) o.w.
(4)
Intuitively, the size of used buffer B(n) forms a “ran-
dom walk” on the real axis between 0 and b, increasing or
decreasing by a packet length L(n) according to whether
the next packet is an arrival or a departure. Since packet
lengths are i.i.d. for alternating renewal processes, the ab-
solute value of the step of B(n) is i.i.d. . Endpoints 0 and
b are “reﬂective barriers” of B(n) in the sense that B(n) is
constrained at the barrier whenever it tries to escape. More
importantly, each escape of B(n) from interval [0, b] rep-
resents an insertion of chaff bits, and the amount of ex-
cess is equal to the amount of chaff bits inserted. There-
fore, the process {B(n)}∞
n=0 directly maps to the maxi-
mum clandestine throughput by the formula in (5), where
(x)+
∆ =max(x, 0), and L′(n) = L(n) if s(n) ∈ st
1 and
L′(n) = −L(n) otherwise.
Note that the above intuitive argument has a critical ﬂaw
because although the absolute step L(n) is i.i.d. , its sign is
not. Actually, the process {B(n)}∞
n=0 is not even Marko-
vian because B(n) alone is not sufﬁcient to predict future
arrivals and departures. We, however, notice that if we en-
rich it with (WO
i (n), WF
i (n)) (i = 1, 2), the elapsed wait-
ing times for the endpoints of the next ON and OFF pe-
riods in Si, then it can be shown that the enriched process  
B(n),
 
WO
i (n), WF
i (n)
 
i=1, 2
 ∞
n=0
isaMarkov process.
Thus, under ergodicity conditions, we can reduce (5) to a
single-letter formula
Tb(S1, S2) = 1−E
 
(B + L − b)+ + (−B − L)+
|L|
 
, (6)
where (B, L) are random variables with the limiting distri-
bution of {(B(n − 1), L′(n))}, assuming it exists. In fact,
4 of 7Tb(S1, S2) = 1 − limsup
N→∞
N  
n=1
(B(n − 1) + L′(n) − b)+ + (−B(n − 1) − L′(n))+
N  
n=1
|L′(n)|
, (5)
it can be shown that
  
WO
i (n), WF
i (n)
 
i=1, 2
 ∞
n=0
is al-
ready a Markov process, and thus {B(n)}∞
n=0 is a Markov-
modulated random walk. In particular, the ergodicity condi-
tion holds for alternating Poisson processes (i.e., ON, OFF
distributions are exponential).
4.2. Special Case: Renewal Processes
As pointed out in Section 3, if we ignore the packet lengths
(e.g., when ON periods are far smaller than OFF periods),
then the transmission schedules are reduced to point pro-
cesses, and theoptimal scheduling algorithm becomes BMR.
Computing the maximum clandestine throughput is equiv-
alent to computing the asymptotic fraction of information
packets embedded by BMR. Speciﬁcally, let B′(n) (n ≥ 0)
bethenumber ofstored packets after thentharrival/departure
packet (B′(0) ≡ 0), then it satisﬁes the following update
B′(n) =



B′(n − 1) + 1 if B′(n − 1) < b,S(n) ∈ S1,
B′(n − 1) − 1 if B′(n − 1) > 0,S(n) ∈ S2,
B′(n − 1) o.w.
Each time a self-loop occurs (i.e., B′(n) = B′(n − 1)), the
nth packet becomes chaff. Thus, the problem is reduced to
counting self-loops in the process (B′(n))∞
n=0.
For i.i.d. Poisson processes, it was shown in [2] that the
limiting probability of self-loops is 1/(1 + b), implying a
clandestine throughput of b/(1 + b). For general renewal
processes, the clandestine throughput is characterized by
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 If Si (i = 1, 2) are i.i.d. renewal processes
with absolutely continuous interarrival distribution, and ∃ǫ,
u0 > 0 such that for all u > u0,
uPr{U − u < V |U > u} ≥ E[U] + ǫ, (7)
where U, V are i.i.d. random variables with the interarrival
distribution, then the fraction of packets embedded by BMR
converges a.s., and the limit (i.e., the maximum clandestine
throughput) is bounded as
Tb(S1, S2)
> =
<
b
1 + b
(8)
if
Pr{U − u > V |U > u}
< =
>
1
2
(9)
for all u ≥ 0, respectively.
Proof: The key is to construct a Markov-modulated
random walk on B′(n) by means similar to that in Section
4.1 and bound the limiting probability of self-loops. See the
proof of Theorem 4.5 in [8] for details.
This theorem gives a sufﬁcient condition for the con-
vergence of BMR and provides qualitative characterization
of the maximum clandestine throughput on point processes.
Speciﬁcally, it compares the clandestine throughput of gen-
eral renewal processes withthat ofPoisson processes, which
is known. The comparison provides a lower or upper bound
on the former, depending on whether the residual interar-
rival time U − u is smaller or larger than the original. In-
tuitively, the smaller the residual interarrival time and thus
the more likely a pending packet arrives earlier than a new
packet, the higher the maximum clandestine throughput.
This is because as the residual interarrival time becomes
stochastically smaller than the original interarrival time, ar-
rival and departure packets will interleave more regularly,
reducing the probability of buffer underﬂow or overﬂow.
Theoretically, it is possible to compute the exact clan-
destine throughput by a Markovian model as in (6). We,
however, choose to focus on characterizations that are easy
to verify. The condition in (9) is further simpliﬁed as fol-
lows.
Corollary 4.2 Under the assumptions in Theorem 4.1, the
clandestine throughput Tb(S1, S2) is lower bounded by,
equal to, or upper bounded by b/(1 + b) if
1. Pr{U − u > V |U > u} is decreasing, independent,
or increasing with u, which in turn is implied by that
2. Pr{U − u > v|U > u} is decreasing, independent,
or increasing with u for all v ≥ 0.
Proof: See [8].
Corollary 4.2 provides an easier way of bounding the
clandestine throughput because condition 2 involves only
one random variable. For example, for the shifted Pareto
distribution with pdf
f
sPar(x)
∆ =βaβ(x + a)−β−1, x ≥ 0, (10)
5 of 7Pr{U − u > v|U > u} is increasing with u for all v,
and hence T
sPar
b ≤ b/(1 + b). For the uniform distribution,
Pr{U − u > v|U > u} is decreasing with u, implying that
T
Uni
b ≥ b/(1 + b). Simulations in Section 5.1 have veriﬁed
these results.
5. SIMULATIONS
5.1. Simulations on Point Processes
We ﬁrst verify the analytical results in Section 4.2 by sim-
ulating the clandestine throughputs of various renewal pro-
cesses using BMR. Fixing the mean interarrival time at 1/λ,
we simulate several types of interarrival distributions in-
cluding the uniform, the exponential, and the shifted Pareto
distributions. Using Poisson trafﬁc as a benchmark, the uni-
form and the shifted Pareto distributions are selected to rep-
resent trafﬁc with lower and higher burstiness, respectively.
As discussed after Corollary 4.2, analysis predicts that the
clandestine throughputs should decrease in the order of uni-
form, exponential, and shifted Pareto.
We plot the simulated clandestine throughputs as func-
tions ofthemaximum buffer sizebinFig.3. Allthethrough-
puts increase with b as expected. Moreover, the simula-
tion results verify the above prediction. In particular, as
the parameter β of the shifted Pareto distribution increases,
its tailweight and hence burstiness decrease (tail probabil-
ity O(x−β)), and the throughput increases. In the limit
β → ∞, the throughput will converge to that of the ex-
ponential distribution (not shown), coinciding with the fact
that the distributions themselves converge. Furthermore, we
have observed that none of the clandestine throughputs are
functions of the trafﬁc rate (i.e., λ). This is because the
buffer size constraint only speciﬁes the relative order of in-
coming and outgoing packets, and the actual timestamps are
irrelevant.
5.2. Simulations on ON-OFF Processes
We then extend the scope to ON-OFF processes. For OFF
periods under the exponential or the shifted Pareto distri-
bution, we generate i.i.d. ON periods (i.e., packet lengths)
according to constant, the uniform, and the exponential dis-
tributions respectively and plot the clandestine throughputs
as functions of the mean packet length; see Fig. 4. The
results continue to conﬁrm that burstiness negatively im-
pacts the achievable throughput: the constant, uniform, and
exponential ON-period distributions have increasing levels
of burstiness and decreasing clandestine throughputs (under
the same OFF-period distribution), and similar conclusions
can be drawn from the comparison between OFF-period
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Fig. 3. Clandestine throughput of point processes (λ = 1,
105 packets per process): the uniform, exponential, and
shifted Pareto (marked by β values) interarrival distribu-
tions.
distributions. The plot shows that the throughputs are not
always monotone with the mean packet length, in contrast
to the behavior with respect to buffer size (Fig. 3). This is
because an increase in mean packet length has two effects:
it reduces the burstiness of packet interarrivals7 (OFF pe-
riods), but increases the burstiness of packet lengths (ON
periods) and the chances of buffer violations (larger packets
are more likely to cause buffer overﬂows/underﬂows).
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Fig. 4. Clandestine throughput of ON-OFF processes (λ =
1, b = 1, 104 packets per process, 100 Monte Carlo runs):
the ﬁxed, uniform, or exponential ON-period distribution
(marked by legends) combined with the exponential (bold
lines) or shifted Pareto (plain lines) OFF-period distribu-
tion.
7We have ﬁxed the total trafﬁc rate, i.e., the average sum of ON and
OFF periods is ﬁxed.
6 of 75.3. Simulations on Traces
We simulate the proposed algorithm on network traces to
study the clandestine throughput in practice. We use the
traces LBL-PKT-4,which contains an hour’s worth of wide-
area trafﬁc between the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and
the Internet8. As the traces only contain one timestamp per
packet, we assume constant packet length per trace which
is estimated by the minimum interarrival time. The simu-
lated clandestine throughputs are then compared with those
of alternating renewal processes with exponential or shifted
Pareto inter-packet delays, as shown in Fig. 5. We ﬁnd that
the shifted Pareto distribution with β = 0.5 gives a good
approximation of the traces (parameter of the exponential
distribution does not affect the results), which is consis-
tent with the previous studies in [9] that have claimed these
traces to have Pareto-like interarrival distributions. Since
β < 1 implies inﬁnite mean interarrival and hence zero
trafﬁc rate, the result suggests that traces have much higher
bustiness and lower clandestine throughputs than alternat-
ing renewal processes of the same rates.
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Fig. 5. Clandestine throughput of traces vs. alternating
renewal processes with exponential or shifted Pareto inter-
packet delays (β = 0.5, 103 packets per process, 17822
process pairs).
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an analytical study of the maximum
throughput of a clandestine relay under stochastic transmis-
sion schedules. Under a buffer size constraint at the re-
lay node, we develop a scheduling algorithm that can em-
8The traces were collected by Paxson and ﬁrst used
in his paper [9], from which we extract 134 TCP traces
of 1000 packets each. The traces can be obtained from
http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/LBL-PKT.html.
bed the maximum amount of relayed trafﬁc into predeter-
mined schedules and analyze theefﬁciency ofthisalgorithm
for schedules following independent ON-OFF renewal pro-
cesses. Our results provide answers to fundamental ques-
tions including how tohide information ﬂowswithout covert
channels and how the rates of such ﬂows are affected by the
resource constraints of relay nodes and the statistical prop-
erties of transmission schedules.
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